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ABSTRACT
It’s widely agreed that animal pain matters morally—that we 
shouldn’t, for instance, starve our animal companions, and that we 
should provide medical care to sick or injured agricultural animals, 
and not only because it benefits us to do so. But do we have the same 
moral responsibilities towards wild animals? Should we feed them 
if they are starving, and intervene to prevent them from undergoing 
other kinds of pain, for instance from predation? Using an example 
that includes both wild and domesticated animals, I outline two con-
trasting ways of thinking about our moral responsibilities with re-
spect to assisting animals that are apparently in need. One approach 
is based entirely around animals’ capacities; the other takes context 
and historical relations into account as well. While not attempting to 
adjudicate between these views, I’ll point out the advantages and dif-
ficulties of both.
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1.Introduction
I’ll begin by constructing an imaginary situation, but one 
that I hope is not too far-fetched. Suppose it’s a hard winter, and 
an intrepid hiker is out for a long walk. The ground is icy, and 
packed with snow, and there’s a strong cold wind. Fenced into a 
nearby field, the hiker sees two short-haired horses. The horses 
have no shelter, their water trough is frozen, and they haven’t 
any food—conditions that are known to create poor horse wel-
fare (University of Maine, 2003). In a corner of the same field, 
deep in the snow, there’s a couple of wild deer—a doe and a 
fawn. The deer also lack shelter and water, and like the horses, 
have nothing to eat. As the hiker watches, a young coyote runs 
into the field and tries to bring down the fawn. Eventually, after 
various attempts to escape, the coyote tears down the fawn and 
there’s a bloody struggle in the snow.
For that hiker passing by, this chilly winter scene might 
raise ethical questions. Should she help the cold and hungry 
horses, or at least find someone else who can assist them? But 
if so, does that mean, to be consistent, she should also help 
the cold and hungry deer? Should she intervene to prevent the 
coyote tearing down the fawn—assuming she could, without 
endangering herself? Or might such an intervention actually be 
wrong? Most generally: What kinds of moral responsibilities 
do we have to wild animals, such as the deer, and are these dif-
ferent from our responsibilities towards domestic animals, such 
as the horses?
A number of different responses to these ethical questions 
are possible. I’ll focus on just two of them here. One possible 
response is that deer are just as morally significant as horses, 
and that whatever we owe to the horses, we also owe to the 
deer. So, if we should assist the horses, we should also assist 
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the deer. This may not mean that we treat them in exactly the 
same way, but in principle what we owe to them is the same. 
A second kind of response distinguishes between what we owe 
to wild animals, such as the deer, and to domesticated animals, 
such as the horses. On this view, while we should assist do-
mesticated animals when threatened by hunger, predators or 
disease, other things being equal, we have either no moral re-
sponsibility, or much less moral responsibility, to assist wild 
animals in similar situations. 
I’ll be exploring these two different responses to assisting 
animals in this paper. Both of them draw on important ethical 
frameworks, frameworks that currently play a role in governing 
assistance to needy fellow humans. Relatively little, though, 
has been written about assisting animals; understandably, the 
focus of work in animal ethics has primarily been on harms to 
animals, rather than on assisting them. However, as the field of 
animal ethics grows, concerns about how and when we should 
help animals are likely to become increasingly important (and 
probably, contentious).
I’ll structure the paper as follows: First, I’ll begin with some 
points of definition and clarification. Then I’ll outline how 
one theoretical approach to animal ethics—an approach that 
I’ll call “capacity-oriented”—would respond to this case, and, 
more generally to questions about assisting wild animals. I’ll 
suggest that, although appealing in some ways, this approach 
may embroil us in broader, more troubling commitments in the 
wild. I’ll then outline a contrasting, theoretical approach, which 
I’ll call “contextual”, and show how it supports an alternative 
position, where we have different moral responsibilities to an-
imals in different contexts and relations to us. But this view 
also generates significant difficulties, and may end up being not 
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much less demanding than the first. Yet, as I’ll suggest in the 
conclusion, these views—though over-simplified as presented 
here—may well be preferable to the alternatives. So some de-
velopment and reworking of these positions may be the best 
way forward in thinking about assisting animals.
2. Definitions and Clarifications: the law, moral 
status and wildness
 (a) The law: My focus here is on animal ethics, rather than 
the law. That’s not to say that the law isn’t very significant here. 
For instance, in Texas, the treatment of the horses I’ve described 
would likely constitute a crime of neglect; the owner has “un-
reasonably failed to provide necessary food, water or care for a 
livestock animal in the person’s custody” (TexCode §9 42.09). 
That it’s illegal to neglect one’s own horses may provide an 
additional motivation to assist the horses in this case, but my 
focus here is on ethical responsibilities that hold independently 
of whether they are legally recognized. I’m not suggesting, ei-
ther, that ethical responsibilities should be legally recognized; 
an ethical argument that suffering wild animals should be as-
sisted should not be taken to imply that such assistance should 
be a legal requirement. Indeed “duty to rescue” laws are con-
troversial even in the human case, and are often not formalized. 
(b) Animals and moral status: By “animals”, I’ll here refer 
to animals that are widely agreed to have experiential or sub-
jective welfare (Keeling et. al. 2011); those whose lives can 
go better or worse for them “from the inside”; in particular, 
animals that are sentient, i.e. can feel pain, and can suffer. I will 
take suffering to include a “wide range of negative emotional 
states” (Dawkins 1980, 25).  I’ll assume that all mammals and 
birds fall into this category, at least. I’ll further assume that if 
a being has welfare in this way, and can feel pain, we should 
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think of it as having “moral status”; it’s the kind of being that 
should factor into our decision-making, because the states it is 
in matter to it. That pain in itself matters morally is, admitted-
ly, denied on some philosophical views (some forms of moral 
contractarianism, for instance). However, the view that pain is 
sufficient for moral status is very widely accepted, and for rea-
sons of space, I won’t defend it further here. (For a much more 
detailed discussion and defense, see Palmer (2010, ch.1)) In 
saying this, I’m not intending to make any claims about how 
much these beings matter, in particular their moral significance 
in relation to humans; nor am I denying that there could be 
other, additional grounds for moral status. All I want to claim 
here is just that they count for something. I should also note that 
I’ll only focus on what might be owed to wild animals as indi-
viduals here, rather than as species members or as contributors 
to ecosystems; these concerns raises other questions that I don’t 
have space to consider.
(c) Wild animals: The term “wild animals” can be used in 
many different ways. “Wild animals” could mean “animals that 
are not tame” that is, it could be a behavioral term; it could 
mean “animals living in relatively uncultivated places”—that 
is, a locational term; or it could mean  “non-domesticated ani-
mals”, where domestication means something like belonging 
to a species or subspecies where breeding is selectively and 
intentionally controlled over generations (Palmer 2011). These 
definitions are all open to challenge; and some animals may be 
wild in all these ways. For the purposes of this paper, I’ll use 
“wild” in the third sense, to mean undomesticated animals. The 
terms “wild” and “domesticated” though, are not intended to be 
exclusive, polar opposites. There are many animals that don’t 
fall straightforwardly into either category; for instance those 
whose genetic makeup is unintentionally but systematically in-
Clare Palmer
20
© Between the Species, 2013
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 16, Issue 1
fluenced by human activities such as hunting, and others whose 
breeding was once, but is no longer, selectively controlled by 
humans. 
Having clarified these points, I’ll return to the main ques-
tion:
3. What (if anything) do we owe wild animals?
One basic point has already emerged: there would be some-
thing morally wrong about deliberately and gratuitously harm-
ing wild sentient animals for no meaningful reason. So, if I 
were to slowly torture and skin wild animals, causing them 
significant pain, for a trivial reason such as that I was bored, 
this would be morally wrong. Claiming that sentient animals 
directly count for something, I think, commits us to this conclu-
sion. But this isn’t very controversial. And it doesn’t, of course, 
mean that all harms to, or killings of, wild animals are wrong. 
On some views, if one killed a sentient animal painlessly, even 
for trivial reasons, such a killing would be morally permissible. 
And there could be very substantial reasons for killing or harm-
ing wild animals—where there are serious conflicts of interests 
between humans and wild animals (for instance, over the trans-
mission of a zoonotic disease); or where there are very sig-
nificant human benefits to be gained. In some circumstances, 
almost all moral views, including both the views I’ll be discuss-
ing, could ethically justify either inflicting pain on wild animals 
or killing them. 
Although there are important issues here, there’s already 
an extensive literature about harming wild animals (Hettinger 
1994, Moriarty and Woods 1997). As I’ve already noted, much 
less has been said about cases such as the one with which I be-
gan. In these cases, the direct cause of animal suffering is non-
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human—such as the weather, disease, lack of food, and preda-
tion. Does what we owe to wild animals include assisting them, 
as well as refraining from some kinds of unnecessary harm? Do 
we have any moral responsibility to feed, shelter or protect wild 
animals, and is this different from any responsibilities we have 
to domestic animals? It’s in this context that I’ll consider the 
two differing views I’ve already outlined: a capacity-oriented 
view, and a contextual view. 
4. Capacity-oriented Consequentialist view 
A number of different kinds of capacity-oriented views ex-
ist; in fact most animal ethicists to date have been capacity-
oriented. Most prominently, animal rights views, such as those 
advocated by Tom Regan (1984) or Gary Francione (2000), fall 
into this category. However, I’ll focus on a rather different kind 
of capacity-oriented view here: a consequentialist, rather than 
a rights one.
A capacity-oriented consequentialist view has two central—
and distinct—features. The first is capacity-orientation. What 
matters about animals, from this perspective, is the particular 
morally-relevant capacities they possess and express, and only 
those capacities. Although a variety of animal capacities might 
be seen as valuable in this sense, including the capacity to have 
preferences or desires, I’ll work with the capacities most com-
monly discussed: the capacities to undergo pain and suffering, 
and to feel pleasure. The second feature here is consequential-
ism. Consequentialist ethical theories are usually characterized 
as maintaining that only the consequences matter in terms of 
evaluating whether some action (or policy, or character trait 
etc) is morally good or bad. Standardly, “an action is morally 
right if and only if there is no other action, among those avail-
able to the agent, that has better consequences” (Shaw, 2007). 
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The goal, then, is to bring about the best expected consequenc-
es in terms of what’s good and what’s bad (though there are dif-
ferent ideas of what is good and bad), normally by maximizing 
what’s good, net of what’s bad.
If we combine these features we create an approach where, 
roughly, we should aim to maximize the total amount of plea-
sure, net of pain and suffering, in the world. (Standard forms 
of philosophical utilitarianism look like this). Although this is 
the view I’ll be discussing here, I should note that these two 
features can come apart. Animal rights views are capacity ori-
ented without being consequentialist. And there are forms of 
consequentialism in which values not based on capacities are 
morally important. But still, the combination of capacity-ori-
entation and consequentialism I’ve outlined is very common, 
especially in animal ethics, and so that’s what I’ll focus on here.
Let’s return to my original example, and consider it through 
the lens of this kind of capacity-oriented consequentialism. At 
first sight, on this view, it would appear as though our passing 
hiker should assist both the horses and the deer. Both are suf-
fering in ways that could be relieved; and the coyote is likely to 
cause the fawn acute pain.  Since the hiker could act to reduce 
pain and suffering, it looks as though the best expected conse-
quences would be brought about by doing so. 
But it might be objected that this kind of intervention would 
not, on closer consideration, bring about the best consequences. 
Tending to domesticated animals—the horses—appears un-
problematic. But suppose we fed all the starving deer in the 
world, and prevented all the painful coyote attacks? Wouldn’t 
this bring us to the situation Aldo Leopold (1949) describes 
in Thinking Like a Mountain: with “the starved bones of the 
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hoped-for deer herd, dead of its own too-much”? Intervention 
could cause an explosive rise in deer populations, a correspond-
ing spike in human feeding commitments, hungry and suffering 
predators, and so on—with a significant risk of causing more 
suffering, rather than less. 
There’s something in this concern, but I’m not sure how far 
it will withstand scrutiny. To consider it more closely requires 
a more careful account of different forms of consequentialism. 
I’ll consider two possibilities here. 
One relevant kind of consequentialism here is act conse-
quentialism. On this view, an act is morally right if and only 
if the total amount of good—in this case pleasure—minus the 
total amount of pain, is greater than the net amount for any 
incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion (Sin-
nott-Armstrong, 2011). So, were we to encounter this situation, 
we should do whatever will bring about the greatest amount 
of good overall on this occasion, rather than being concerned 
about what would result if the same decision were taken on 
every similar occasion. This does not mean ignoring the ex-
pected long-term consequences of what we do on this occasion. 
It means that what we decide in this case doesn’t necessarily 
commit us to doing the same thing in other, apparently similar 
situations; the acts relevant to each different situation should 
be judged independently. And taking this particular situation 
alone, assisting seems to be best. Feeding the deer appears to 
have better consequences than leaving them hungry. In the lon-
ger term, they may get hungry again; but we can reasonably 
expect that nourishing food now will reduce their total winter 
suffering. It’s unlikely that the survival of these two particu-
lar deer alone will make a big difference in over-grazing (and 
therefore, animal suffering more broadly) in future years. We 
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can also expect best consequences from protecting the fawn. 
The coyote may be hungry now, but its hunger is unlikely to be 
as bad as the fawn’s pain (not to mention the loss of all the fu-
ture pleasurable experience that this fawn’s life might contain, 
if it continued to live). And while the coyote will certainly try 
to find something else to eat, it may scavenge, eat berries, or 
trash, that would cause less pain than killing the fawn. So in 
terms of expected consequences from this single situation, it 
seems likely that the passing hiker should assist, because we 
owe wild animals what we owe generally: to maximize pleasure 
net of pain, and we can reasonably expect assisting to achieve 
this in this particular case.
However, some consequentialists argue that focusing on in-
dividual acts does not necessarily bring about best consequenc-
es. Instead, they argue, we should adopt what Driver (2012, 
86) calls the “indirection strategy”: where “the right action 
is the action performed in accordance with (or as a result of) 
something else that maximizes the good, such as a set of rules 
or a type of motivation”. The most widely accepted form of 
indirect consequentialism is rule conequentialism, and, for that 
reason, I’ll focus on rule consequentialism here. A rule conse-
quentialist argues that we should follow rules that “if commu-
nally accepted would, as far as we can tell, bring about the best 
consequences” (Hooker 2000, 1). This means that rather than 
thinking about all the consequences in this specific case, we 
should instead think about what communally accepted rule, if 
followed more generally in cases of this kind, we would expect 
to bring about best consequences. 
Identifying such a rule isn’t easy. A rule such as “We should 
always feed hungry wild animals” or “We should always as-
sist animals threatened with predation” is very unlikely to bring 
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about best consequences. But rules that affirm the contrary also 
seem unlikely to bring about best consequences. For instance 
“Never feed hungry wild animals” would appear to prohibit 
practices that seem harmless or that may promote good, such 
as feeding wild birds in the garden. This suggests that any rule 
would require very careful specification, and each rule would 
only apply to some subset of wild animal cases. This could 
become complex and unwieldy (which most rule consequen-
tialists find problematic, since for communal acceptance, rules 
need to be fairly simple) and if specified far enough, would end 
up turning into act consequentialism. 
Rule formation is itself tricky. But once we’ve begun think-
ing about general rules of this kind, broader questions are 
raised. After all, both rule and act consequentialism here are 
roughly committed to maximize the total amount of expected 
pleasure, net of pain, in the world. And this doesn’t seem lim-
ited to assistance. It appears to extend to managing the natural 
world more broadly. After all, the natural world is full of pain 
and suffering. If humans should be trying to minimize pain and 
suffering in the world, then this does not mean not just caus-
ing, or relieving, existing suffering; presumably, it also entails 
trying to change the world such that less suffering arises in the 
first place. As McMahan (2010) recently suggested:  “Suppose 
that we could arrange the gradual extinction of carnivorous 
species, replacing them with new herbivorous ones. Or suppose 
that we could intervene genetically, so that currently carnivo-
rous species would gradually evolve into herbivorous ones,…
If we could bring about the end of predation by one or the other 
of these means at little cost to ourselves, ought we to do it?” 
His answer to this question is, essentially that we should. It may 
not be possible just now, because we don’t know enough about 
the potential effects of doing this on whole ecosystems, so we 
Clare Palmer
26
© Between the Species, 2013
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 16, Issue 1
might end up causing more suffering than we prevent. But the 
principle is clear: If we could do it, and it would not cause more 
suffering than not doing it, we should. From this perspective, 
what we owe all animals, wild or not, is to try to make their 
lives better, in whatever ways we can, including preventing the 
existence of animals that, overall, will make the lives of more 
animals worse.
This conclusion follows from the combination of the two 
features I identified earlier: capacity orientation and conse-
quentialism. In terms of capacity-orientation: the focus only 
on animals’ capacities, such as the capacities to feel pain and 
pleasure, makes the distinction signaled in the title of this pa-
per—between “wild” and “domesticated”, morally irrelevant. 
Wildness is not a capacity; it’s more like the absence of a cer-
tain relation. What matters here is whether and how much an 
animal suffers, not whether it’s wild or otherwise. Assuming 
that there are no significant physiological differences that (for 
instance) cause horses to suffer more from hunger than deer 
(or vice versa), there are no relevant moral differences between 
them either.  When combined with consequentialism—the aim 
at best expected outcomes—this view means that all pain and 
pleasure falls within the scope of moral concern. On a conse-
quentialist view of this kind, suffering is suffering, wherever 
it’s found; and if we can relieve it, or prevent it arising, without 
creating equivalent suffering or diminution of pleasure else-
where, we should. We owe to wild sentient animals exactly 
what we owe to any sentient animal: to promote their pleasure, 
and to prevent or relieve their pain and suffering, where we 
can do so without diminishing pleasure and increasing pain 
in others. Of course, there may be some different long-term 
consequences down the line from assisting horses and assist-
ing deer—for instance, feeding deer may negatively impact the 
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genotype of future deer. But the suffering of wild deer, in itself, 
is just as demanding of our moral attention as the suffering of 
domestic horses.
Although not all kinds of consequentialism turn out exact-
ly like this (some philosophers have created less demanding 
forms—perhaps Scheffler’s (1994) hybrid consequentialism, 
satisficing consequentialism, or Varner’s (2012) two-level con-
sequentialism), something like this conclusion flows from most 
leading consequentialist views in animal ethics. However, the 
alternative contextual, non-consequentialist approach I’ll con-
sider now comes to a contrasting view—that we have different 
obligations towards animals with whom we have different rela-
tions, even if the animals are very similar in terms of morally-
relevant capacities (such as the capacity to feel pleasure and 
pain). 
5. Contextual, Non-Consequentialist View
The kind of contextual position I’ll outline here differs with 
respect to both the two key features of the previous view. First, 
although animals’ capacities—such as the capacity to suffer—
are important, they aren’t all that matters morally. Certain rela-
tions between humans and animals matter too. In particular, on 
this view, “backward looking” considerations are important—
that is, how animals got into the situations they are in. It’s often 
maintained that concerns of this kind are morally important in 
the human case. For instance, choosing to have a child, it’s fre-
quently argued, creates special responsibilities to that child that 
one doesn’t have to any other child. (For instance, see O’Neill 
1979, 26.) On a contextual view, arguments with a similar form 
also apply to domesticating animals. 
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Second, the kind of contextual view I’ll discuss is not conse-
quentialist (though consequentialist forms of contextual views 
might be possible). What’s central are certain constraints, in 
particular not causing harms to others (taking harms in some-
thing like Feinberg’s (1992) sense to mean the wrongful setting 
back of significant interests). At first sight, this might be taken 
to suggest that there are no moral responsibilities to assist at all, 
thus moving from a view that may have seemed over-reaching, 
to one that has no reach! The hiker, after all, is not planning to 
harm the animals; the question is about assisting animals that 
are already suffering.
But this is too simple: there are important human/animal 
entanglements here. After all, humans bred these horses, and 
bred them selectively, in ways that made them vulnerable to 
the cold, with thinner, sleeker coats than wild horses. And they 
were made yet more vulnerable once in existence by having 
their coats kept short, and by being confined, so that it’s impos-
sible for them to independently seek shelter or food elsewhere. 
Although humans have not directly harmed these horses, then, 
they have made them vulnerable. This vulnerability may not ex-
actly have been intended, but it was at least easily foreseeable: 
if animals are kept with short coats, confined without shelter, 
not provided with sufficient food and water, and it’s the winter, 
it’s obvious that they will be vulnerable to the cold. And, since 
humans have put them in the position where they are now suf-
fering, on this contextual view, there are special obligations to 
assist. The reason why the horses should be assisted is not just 
that they are suffering, but because humans are responsible for 
making them vulnerable to that suffering.
However, the wild deer are in a different situation. Humans 
haven’t selectively bred them, and they haven’t been confined 
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or restrained. Their lives are, essentially, independent of ours. 
So, there’s no special obligation on this basis to feed the hungry 
deer, nor to protect hungry deer from a hungry coyote. On this 
contextual view, then, in contrast to the capacity-oriented one 
outlined earlier, while we should not intentionally harm wild 
animals without good reason, if we haven’t caused their vul-
nerability, we don’t have any special obligation to assist them. 
What happens to them is not our moral business. 
It’s worth noting that this contextual view isn’t based on 
the argument that we shouldn’t interfere with what’s “wild” 
or “natural”, or with wild processes such as predation. Some 
environmental ethicists do make such claims (in fact, in an-
other context, Preston (2011) recently called non-interference 
in nature the “presumptive argument” in environmental ethics). 
Certainly, in some cases, this contextual view and wildness-
preserving accounts of environmental ethics will coincide in 
practice.  But on this contextual view, assisting wild animals 
isn’t necessarily wrong; rather, it just isn’t normally required, 
even if it would relieve suffering, because the kind of rela-
tionship that would generate such special obligations to assist 
doesn’t normally exist between humans and wild animals. On 
this view, obligations to assist only arise when there is some 
kind of historical entanglement. (There might be a different 
version of this view—that requirements to assist do exist in 
such cases but that they are much weaker where there’s no prior 
entanglement; however, I don’t have space to develop such a 
view here.) 
To say “doesn’t normally exist”, though, doesn’t mean that 
there are no occasions where wild animals might be owed assis-
tance. If humans prevent wild animals from living independent 
lives, then special obligations to assist them may be acquired. 
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So, captivity or habitat destruction might create such special 
obligations. “Wild” and “domesticated”, then, are terms that 
point to broader relations of independence versus human-creat-
ed dependence and vulnerability. It’s these relations, rather than 
being “wild” or “domesticated” in themselves, that matter here.
An implication of this contextual view is that—unlike on the 
kind of consequentialist view I outlined earlier—there would 
be no reason to aim to reduce the amount of suffering in nature 
by managing or shaping nature differently, assuming we could 
do so successfully. A contextual view alone wouldn’t forbid do-
ing this (though there might be other good reasons not to do it) 
but it’s not morally required, nor even morally desirable, on 
this view, to make wild nature a less painful place.
This contextual approach, then, which takes into account re-
lations as well as capacities, and does not aim to bring about 
best consequences, may appear to have some advantages over 
a capacity-oriented, consequentialist view. It reflects the wide-
ly held belief that special relations, (for instance, of created 
dependence, as with our own children) create special obliga-
tions; and it offers a less all-encompassing vision of our ethi-
cal responsibilities than do standard forms of consequentialism 
(though still, in the animal case, obligations significantly more 
demanding than those we normally accept, since it’s rare, for 
instance, for anyone to consider that anything at all is owed 
to individual wild animals made vulnerable by human habitat 
destruction). 
However, this contextual approach has its own difficulties 
that may lead us to think that this, more restricted view of what 
we owe wild animals is nonetheless untenable. I’ll consider just 
two of the many difficulties here.
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(a) This view draws on what Nozick (1974, 155) calls a “his-
torical principle”, where past circumstances or actions can be a 
direct justification for different entitlements. It looks back at the 
ways in which people did (or did not) became entangled with 
particular animals in order to work out what’s owed to them. 
However, as with similar human cases, the history of entangle-
ment may not be clear. And, even more significantly, there’s a 
problem about who’s supposed to be responsible for assistance. 
For instance, in the horse case I’ve raised: Suppose a farmer 
has bred these horses, and then left them in the snowy field 
without food, water or shelter. It’s plausible that the farmer has 
special obligations to provide for the horses, obligations that 
she’s failing to meet. But just because she has failed to do what 
she should, does that mean that a passer-by inherits her respon-
sibilities? Does this contextual view presuppose some idea of 
collective responsibility—that I am responsible for what other 
people do—or fail to do?
There are, I think, ways of resolving such questions about 
who is responsible for assistance in cases like these (similar 
issues arise in human cases, for instance in terms of reparations 
claims; see Palmer (2010) for a more detailed discussion.) But 
problems about who has moral responsibility for what do make 
this contextual view complicated in practice. It may work bet-
ter in policy-making contexts, where historical relations and 
responsibilities can be more carefully considered, than on an 
everyday basis where individuals are reacting and making de-
cisions about particular situations on short timescales with in-
complete information.
(b) A second factor makes this even more complicated: 
fewer and fewer animals live completely independently of hu-
mans, even where their breeding is not controlled by people. 
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Although the deer in this case have not been selectively bred, 
human wildlife management has probably had some impact on 
their existence or their lives. And anthropogenic climate change 
is already affecting many wild animals’ habitats, raising ques-
tions about whether we should, in some cases, embark on pro-
grams of assisted migration. If anthropogenic phenomena such 
as climate change create moral responsibilities to assist wild 
animals, then the contextual view appears to become almost 
as demanding as the consequentialist, capacity-oriented view. 
I can only offer some very broad responses to this compli-
cation here. The first, most general point, I think, is that ob-
ligations to assist individual animals that result from broad 
anthropogenic environmental impacts such as climate change 
are likely to be weaker than those that result from practices 
such as selective breeding. One reason for this is the nature of 
the human practices involved. In at least some cases, animals 
are deliberately and directly bred to be vulnerable—labora-
tory mice genetically modified to develop particular diseases, 
for instance. In other cases, selectively breeding and confining 
animals—as with the horses—makes them vulnerable in ways 
that, as I’ve noted, can easily be foreseen, even if not exactly 
intended. And in all modern domestication cases, at least, hu-
mans directly intend to create and shape animals’ bodies. The 
impacts of climate change on wild animals are somewhat dif-
ferent: while it is increasingly obvious that there are and will 
be effects on wild animals, these are effects of a practice not 
aimed at animals at all; and in this sense it is less intentional 
(and certainly less predictable) than the effects of domestica-
tion (though this argument will likely weaken over time)(see 
Nolt 2011).  Second, it’s currently difficult, and likely to remain 
difficult, to identify exactly what ecological shifts actually can 
be attributed to climate change. Third, as current research indi-
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cates, some animals will actually benefit from climate change, 
so these animals, the beneficiaries, would not be owed any as-
sistance. Fourth, in many cases it might not be possible to sus-
tain assistance. If, for instance, an area is becoming significant-
ly drier, the provision of (say) replacement artificial wetlands 
habitat for animals, while in some sense responding to human-
created vulnerability, is likely to create more vulnerability over 
time, given the degree of climate change to which we are now 
committed. It may be better in these cases just to stand back, 
and to allow animals better adapted to dry climatic conditions 
to move into the area. And finally, any assistance should not 
generate new obligations. So, for instance, assisted migration is 
one way of helping certain animals made vulnerable by climate 
change. But this practice raises the danger of creating vulner-
ability in new animal populations—those that have to compete 
with new residents—as well as potentially producing stress and 
distress to those animals moved to new habitats. So, climate 
change raises very difficult issues: concerning the kind of in-
tention involved, the benefits as well as costs it may bring to 
wild animals, and because assistance may generate new vul-
nerabilities while at the same time relieving others. In cases of 
this kind, a contextual view would seem to suggest at least very 
careful consideration before acting to assist. But even if, for 
these reasons, the special obligations to animals created by cli-
mate change may be less stringent than it at first appears, these 
kinds of problems certainly do make this kind of contextual 
view extremely complex. 
6. Conclusion
I’ve outlined two different theoretical ideas of what we might 
owe to wild animals, focusing on when (if ever) we should help 
them. First, I considered a consequentialist, capacity-oriented 
view, which by different routes maintains that we should aim to 
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bring about greatest pleasure, net of pain and suffering, in the 
world, including among wild animals. Some philosophical and 
religious traditions regard this as the best way of viewing our 
obligations towards animals, accepting the focus on animals’ 
capacities, not their relations to us, and the demanding ethical 
position that this view implies. Then I considered a contextual 
view, one maintaining that harming animals, whether wild or 
not, without good reason is unethical; but that we’re only re-
quired to assist them if there’s some sense in which we are re-
sponsible for their vulnerability or suffering. This seems at first 
sight less demanding, but raises questions about who is respon-
sible for doing what, and appears to become more demanding 
if we take anthropogenic phenomena such as climate change to 
create obligations to assist. 
Both these views seem unsatisfactory in various ways; in 
particular, perhaps both commit us to too much with respect 
to what we owe to wild animals. But what are the alternatives, 
assuming that we take animal suffering seriously?
(a) One possibility is just to reject the idea that we have 
obligations to assist any animals, including compan-
ion and agricultural animals, except where it benefits 
people, even where humans are responsible for the 
suffering or vulnerability. Since it usually does benefit 
people to look after their companion or agricultural an-
imals, this would get some of the way to protecting do-
mesticated animals, but not many wild ones. However, 
it leaves us with a lot of difficult cases, and provides us 
with no moral grounds for judging the actions of those 
who do abandon or neglect domesticated animals, if 
they can claim that it’s not in their interests (as owners) 
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to continue to provide for them. This is surely a prob-
lematic position. 
(b) A second possibility is to identify a distinction be-
tween what’s owed to wild and domesticated animals 
that’s not dependent, as is the contextual account, on 
a ‘historical principle’ of how animal suffering or vul-
nerability came about—since this view will inevitably 
generate assistance to some wild animals—but on some 
other factor. However, I’m not sure what this account 
might be, nor how it would have the ethical plausibility 
that created dependence and vulnerability carries. 
Neither of these possibilities obviously supplants the posi-
tions I’ve discussed in more detail in this paper. But certainly, 
developments and refinements of the capacity-oriented con-
sequentialist view and the contextual view I’ve discussed are 
not only possible but also desirable. I’ve tried to give a bal-
anced account of the merits and difficulties with both positions 
(though obviously in somewhat simplified form). I expect that 
much more complex and nuanced accounts of when and wheth-
er we should assist animals will shortly emerge in the growing 
scholarship on animal ethics.  
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